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TRIAL ERROR BLUNDER: 
COMPOUNDED USE OF DEFENDANT’S POST-ARREST 
SILENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT AND SUMMATION PURPOSES 
IS NOT HARMLESS 
  
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
 
People v. Tucker1 
(decided September 20, 2011) 
 
I. THE MATTER OF PEOPLE V. TUCKER 
 The defendant in this action appealed his conviction of two 
counts of second degree attempted murder and first degree attempted 
robbery.2  After his arrest, the defendant was questioned by law 
enforcement officers yet remained silent.3  At trial, “the People were 
permitted to question him about his post-arrest silence” and comment 
further upon it repeatedly during summation.4  On appeal, the court 
determined “post-arrest silence . . . cannot be used for impeachment 
purposes”5 and the use of such silence against a defendant is 
                                                          
1 929 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2011). 
2 Id. at 632. 
3 Id. at 632-33. 
4 Id.; see People v. Conyers, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935 (N.Y. 1981) (“[W]e conclude that the 
use of such evidence for impeachment purposes cannot be justified . . . .”). 
5 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 633; see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628 (1993) 
(stating the use of a defendant‟s silence for impeachment purposes after Miranda warnings 
were given is a violation of “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [and] 
[t]his rule „rests on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his 
silence will not be held against him and then using his silence to impeach an explanation 
subsequently offered at trial‟ ”) (quoting Wainright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291 
(1986)). 
1
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“fundamentally unfair.”6  The Appellate Division held both issues 
were permitted in error, overturned the conviction, and remanded the 
matter for a new trial.7 
People v. Tucker8 concerns the shootings of Asin Nelson and 
Stanley McKinnon.9  Within hours of the shootings, the defendant, 
Tucker, was arrested as a suspect and read his Miranda10 rights.11  
The police asked the defendant if he was willing to talk about the 
incident.12  He responded, “No.”13  Subsequently, a police officer 
informed the defendant that he was going to be charged for attempted 
murder.14  It was at this point the defendant said, “I was there, but I 
didn‟t shoot anybody.”15  After he made that statement, the defendant 
remained silent.16  A suppression hearing was held and the statement 
was suppressed.17  During the jury trial, an eye witness and the two 
victims testified that the defendant was the shooter, and that he wore 
a black hooded sweatshirt at the time of the incident.18  The jury was 
shown grainy video footage of the shooting, post-arrest photographs 
of the defendant, and still images from the video.19  The eyewitness 
and the victims were unable to identify one man in the video who 
was wearing a “do-rag” and a white long-sleeved t-shirt.20  In his own 
defense, the defendant testified he was the man in the white t-shirt.21  
While this established his presence at the shooting, the defendant 
                                                          
6 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 633; see also Brecht, 507 U.S. at 628. 
7 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635. 
8 929 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2011). 
9 Id. at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
11 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 636; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (holding if someone is 
taken into custody the four Miranda warnings are: (1) before being questioned the suspect 
must be warned about his or her “right to remain silent;” (2) that anything the suspect says 
“can be used against him [or her] in a court of law;” (3) that the suspect “has the right to the 
presence of an attorney;” (4) that if the suspect “cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him [or her] prior to any questioning if [the suspect] so desires”). 
12 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33 (majority opinion). 
13 Id. at 633. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 633 (majority opinion). 
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claimed he was not the shooter.22  Instead, he testified the person in 
the video dressed in black was his friend “Mustafa” and that 
“Mustafa” was responsible for the victim‟s injuries.23 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant 
multiple times if he had told the police the identity of the shooter 
after his arrest.24  The following is the pertinent part of the 
prosecutor‟s questioning the defendant: 
Q. Did you tell the police it was Mustafa who did the 
shooting? 
 
A. I told the police. They asked me did you shoot him. 
I told the police [,] I was there but I didn‟t shoot 
nobody. 
 
Q. But you didn‟t tell them it was Mustafa; right? 
 
A. They asked me. They asked me— 
THE COURT: Answer the question. 
Q. Did you tell them it was Mustafa? 
 
THE COURT: Answer that question. 
 
A. No.25 
Another major issue occurred during the prosecutor‟s summation.26  
A repeated reference to the defendant‟s silence after his arrest was 
stressed by the district attorney.27  It was said, “[A]n innocent person 
when they‟re arrested for a crime they didn‟t commit and they know 
who did it will say [who] did it.”28  This was combined with the 
statement that “the defendant tailored his testimony that he was the 
man dressed in white after listening to the testimony of the 
victims.”29 
                                                          




26 Id. at 632 (majority opinion). 
27 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
3
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The reasoning of the Appellate Division concentrated on 
whether it was improper to use post-arrest silence for impeachment 
purposes at the defendant‟s criminal trial.30  The risk of prejudice is 
considerable and of little probative value “whenever the prosecution 
attempts to impeach a defendant‟s trial testimony by questioning him 
about his prior failure to come forward.”31  The United States 
Supreme Court has held “[i]n such circumstances it [is] 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the 
arrested person‟s silence to be used to impeach an explanation 
subsequently offered at trial.”32  However, if a suspect speaks to 
police and the “given circumstances make it most unnatural to omit 
certain information from a statement, the fact of the omission is itself 
admissible for purposes of impeachment.”33  Here, the defendant 
invoked his right to remain silent.34  The court found this case was 
“squarely controlled” by the decisions in People v. Santiago35 and 
People v. Torres.36  In Santiago, the Appellate Division stated, “the 
defendant‟s mere denial of his involvement in the shooting upon 
arrest was not tantamount to a waiver of his right to remain silent.”37  
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals held “[t]he State is denied 
the right to draw adverse inferences from the fact that the defendant 
has maintained effective silence, even if something less than total.”38 
In the instant matter, after his arrest, Tucker did not wish to 
                                                          
30 Id. at 633 (majority opinion). 
31 Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 935. 
32 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976). 
33 People v. Savage, 409 N.E.2d 858, 861 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that “an omission speaks 
more eloquently than words” especially when “[i]t [would have] put an entirely different 
cast on the event” if it had been mentioned). 
34 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634. 
35 501 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403-04 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1986); see also Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 
634. 
36 490 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794-95 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1985); see also Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 
634 (stating the defendants in Santiago and Torres simply denied participation in their 
respective crimes); Santiago, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 403-04 (explaining the State is not allowed 
the right to “draw adverse inferences” from the defendant invoking his right to remain silent 
and “the prosecutor‟s questioning of the defendant [during the trial] in this regard was in 
error”); Torres, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95 (stating the “prosecutor's inquiry concerning the 
failure of [the] defendant . . . to report [his] alibi to the police was improper . . . [and] the 
prosecutor‟s comments during summation were improper [especially] [t]he prosecutor‟s 
consistent implication that defendant and his trial counsel had concocted the alibi”). 
37 Santiago, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 403. 
38 Savage, 409 N.E.2d at 862. 
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speak to the police and he succinctly told them his feelings.39  In one 
sentence, he stated he was not the shooter.40  This statement only 
implicated him as being present at the incident.41  The court held “the 
defendant maintained an effective silence.”42  This conclusion was 
ascertained from the fact the defendant wanted to remain silent, 
understood he had no obligation to elaborate, did not have to 
implicate his friend, and had “knowledge . . . his decision not to 
speak would not be used against him at trial.”43  Ultimately, the 
defendant‟s post-arrest omission about naming the actual shooter was 
found to be “of minimal probative value.”44  If presented to a jury, 
however, a defendant‟s “ „pretrial failure to speak when confronted 
by law enforcement officials‟ ” carries the risk of being highly 
prejudicial.45 
Lastly, the court concluded the defendant “did not use his 
Miranda rights as a shield against contradictions of untruths.”46 
                                                          
39 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634. 
40 Id. at 633. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 634. 
43 Id. 
44 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634; see also Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 935 (stating a 
defendant‟s “silence in such circumstances may simply be attributable to his awareness that 
he is under no obligation to speak or to the natural caution that arises from his knowledge 
that anything he says might later be used against him at trial”). 
45 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 633 (quoting Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 935); see also Conyers, 
420 N.E.2d at 934.  The New York Court of Appeals created what has become known as 
“the Conyers proscription [against use of post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes]” 
(quoting Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634). 
[T]he risk of prejudice is substantial whenever the prosecution attempts 
to impeach a defendant‟s trial testimony by questioning him about his 
prior failure to come forward with an exculpatory version of events.  
Jurors, who are not necessarily sensitive to the wide variety of 
alternative explanations for a defendant‟s pretrial silence, may be prone 
to construe such silence as an admission and, as a consequence, may 
draw an unwarranted inference of guilt.  Because evidence of a 
defendant‟s pretrial silence may have a disproportionate impact upon the 
minds of the jurors and because the potential for prejudice inherent in 
such evidence outweighs its marginal probative worth, we conclude that 
the use of such evidence for impeachment purposes cannot be justified 
in the absence of unusual circumstances. 
Id. at 935-36. 
46 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634; see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) 
(“The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way 
of a defense, free from risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent statements.”). 
5
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[T]he United States Supreme Court held that a 
statement obtained in violation of any aspect of a 
defendant‟s Miranda rights, although not admissible 
as evidence-in-chief, may be used to impeach a 
defendant who chooses to take the stand and whose 
testimony is inconsistent with his illegally obtained 
statement.47 
But here, the defendant‟s statements at trial were consistent with his 
pre-trial statements.48  The defendant here was impeached “not with 
an inconsistent statement, but, rather, with his failure to speak, to tell 
the police” the identity of the shooter.49  Therefore, the case falls 
under the purview “of [People v.] Conyers,50 which concerns the use 
of post-arrest silence” and the prosecutor‟s general prohibition “from 
using such silence for impeachment purposes.”51  The court found it 
improper for the People to use the post-arrest silence to impeach the 
defendant.52  Due to its substantial prejudicial effect, the error was 
not harmless as it could have affected the verdict.53  The summation 
references to the post-arrest silence compounded the error and a new 
trial was warranted.54 
 
                                                          
47 People v. Maerling, 474 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. 1984). 
48 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635.  The defendant was perfectly consistent when he testified 
he was at the shooting and that Mustafa was the shooter, and when he said during a pre-trial 
interrogation that he was at the shooting and was not the shooter. 
49 Id. 
50 420 N.E.2d 933 (N.Y. 1981). 
51 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635; see also Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 934; id. at 935 (stating 
the New York Court of Appeals has recognized “evidence of defendant‟s pretrial silence 
may have a disproportionate impact on the minds of the jurors”). 
52 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635. 
53 Id. (articulating the only evidence provided that the defendant was the shooter was “in-
court identification of the defendant by two brothers and their friend” and “grainy 
surveillance video and still pictures taken from the video” from which the identity of the 
shooter was not discernable). 
54 Id.; but see Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 637-38 (Rivera, J., dissenting) (stating defendant 
prevailed at suppression hearing and was not insulated from cross-examination for 
impeachment purposes regarding omission of shooter‟s identity as it was the ultimate issue 
in the case and because the Miranda shield is not permitted to be used as a sword.  Further, 
the summation remarks were improper but not flagrant enough for a reversal as evidence of 
guilt was overwhelming). 
6
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II. REFERENCE DURING TRIAL REGARDING DEFENDANT’S 
SILENCE AT OR NEAR TIME OF ARREST 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees that “no person shall be” compelled “to be a witness 
against” him or herself in a criminal matter.
55
  This amendment, 
which encompasses the right to remain silent and the self-
incrimination clause, is said to “register[ ] an important advance in 
the development of our liberty—one of the great landmark‟s in man‟s 
struggle to be civilized.”56  The Supreme Court stated that the right to 
remain silent “reflects many of our fundamental values and most 
noble aspirations . . . [and allows an individual the privilege] „to a 
private enclave where he may lead a private life.‟ ”57  Although it 
may “sometimes [be] „a shelter to the guilty,‟ [it] is often „a 
protection to the innocent.‟ ”58   
A. The Federal Approach 
 
The right to remain silent is a constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination in criminal matters because anything an individual 
says can be used against him or her in court.59  Once a suspect is 
arrested and a “custodial interrogation” is initiated by law 
enforcement, the suspect may “indicate[ ] in any manner, at any time 
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent [and] 
the interrogation must cease.”60  Additionally, any statement obtained 
by or used by the government in violation of a defendant‟s Fifth 
Amendment rights is inadmissible during the defendant‟s criminal 
trial.61  Miranda warnings are only administered to a suspect during 
                                                          
55 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). 
56 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1, 3 (1964).  In this landmark case, the Court held the privilege against self-incrimination is 
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
57 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm‟n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting 
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 566, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)). 
58 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)). 
59 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
60 Id. at 473-74. 
61 New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1979).  When given a grant of immunity 
7
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or after being placed in custody when the objectively reasonable 
person would ascertain they are under arrest.62  After he or she is 
given Miranda warnings, a suspect may “knowingly and intelligently 
waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a 
statement.”63  Therefore, unless Miranda warnings “and waiver are 
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as the 
result of an interrogation can be used against [the defendant].”64  
However, the Court determined in Harris v. New York65 that use of 
evidence for impeachment purposes allows for a more lenient 
interpretation.66 
In Harris, the petitioner was arrested for allegedly selling 
heroin to an undercover police officer and was interrogated without 
being properly Mirandized.67  The statements made during the police 
interrogation were rendered inadmissible for the prosecution‟s case-
in-chief under Miranda.68  The petitioner took the stand in his own 
defense and testified he knew who the arresting police officer was, 
but that he never sold heroin to the undercover cop.69  The testimony 
contradicted the statements made during the post-arrest police 
                                                                                                                                      
to provide testimony before a grand jury, the witness testimony given cannot be later used in 
the case-in-chief nor for impeachment purposes in a criminal trial against that witness. 
62 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485 (stating warnings must be given “as soon as practicable after 
arrest” and prior to any “interview with [a] person for a confession of admission of his own 
guilt”).  See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (stating during a DWI 
stop, the defendant knew while he was being questioned that he was not under arrest or 
functionally under arrest and was not waiving his rights). 
63 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
64 Id. at 479-80 (explaining “the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual 
when confronted by the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that 
an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself [and] [t]hat right cannot 
be abridged . . . .  [L]iberty [] demand[s] that government officials shall be subject[ ] to  . . . 
rules of conduct . . . [because] [c]rime is contagious [and] [i]f the government [became] a 
lawbreaker, it [would] breed[ ] contempt for [the] law [and] invite[ ] every man to become a 
law unto himself; it [would] invite[ ] anarchy”). 
65 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
66 Id. at 225-26 (“Had inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some third 
person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by 
way of cross-examination and impeachment.”). 
67 Id. at 222-23. 
68 Id. at 223-24 (stating the defendant was not informed of his right to an attorney before 
being questioned); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
69 Harris, 401 U.S. at 223 (claiming the bag sold did not contain heroin but only baking 
soda). 
8
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interrogation.70  On cross-examination, the prosecutor impeached the 
petitioner by asking about and reciting the statements made to the 
police post-arrest.71  The petitioner “testified that he could not 
remember virtually any of the questions or answers” made during 
that interrogation.72  The jury convicted the petitioner and the 
petitioner appealed.73  The Court stated that physical evidence could 
be used for impeachment purposes despite being inadmissible for use 
during the case-in-chief.74  Furthermore, it reasoned, “[t]he shield 
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use 
perjury by way of the defense, free from the risk of confrontation 
with prior inconsistent statements.”75  The judgment was affirmed 
and the use of the “earlier conflicting statements” was appropriately 
utilized to impeach the petitioner.76 
The Supreme Court has reviewed many issues surrounding 
the right to remain silent and the nuances involved in resolving the 
constitutionality of using a defendant‟s statements for impeachment 
purposes.  In Doyle v. Ohio,77 the Court held the use of a Mirandized 
suspect‟s silence for impeachment purposes at trial was 
fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process.78  This is known 
as a Doyle violation.79  However, in Jenkins v. Anderson,80 the Court 
held that prior to Miranda warnings, a suspect‟s silence can be used 





74 Harris, 401 U.S. at 224; see Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (holding 
physical evidence inadmissible during case-in-chief allowed for impeachment purposes). 
75 Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.  The Court logically elaborated on its reasoning in stating: 
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative 
use of evidence unlawfully obtained.  It is quite another to say that the 
defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the 
Government‟s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and 
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. 
Id. at 224. 
76 Id. at 226. 
77 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
78 Id. at 618. 
79 See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 (“We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of the 
petitioner‟s silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
80 447 U.S. 231 (1980). 
9
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for impeachment purposes by the prosecution when cross-examining 
a defendant.81  The Jenkins decision “does not force any state court to 
allow impeachment through the use of prearrest silence.”82  It only 
states that this form of impeachment is constitutional.83  The crucial 
difference between Doyle and Jenkins focuses on fundamental 
fairness based upon the fact that “Miranda warnings inform a person 
that he has the right to remain silent and assure him, at least 
implicitly, that his subsequent decision to remain silent cannot be 
used against him.”84 
The Court has also considered what standard should be 
utilized when assessing the impact on a jury verdict where a 
defendant‟s post-Miranda silence was improperly used for 
impeachment purposes.85  In Brecht v. Abrahamson,86 a Doyle 
violation occurred when post-Miranda silence was used by the 
government to impeach the defendant during a murder trial.87  The 
defendant was arrested, given his Miranda rights, and charged with 
murder for allegedly shooting his brother-in-law in the back with a 
rifle.88  The defendant took the stand and mentioned for the first time 
that he committed the shooting, but stated it was an accident.89  The 
prosecutor inferred the defendant remained silent until all the 
evidence was heard and then testified by creating “this crazy story” 
that the shooting was an “accident.”90  The Court held it was an error 
to use the post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes.91  The 
standard to determine the impact on the verdict is whether the error 
had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 
                                                          
81 Id. at 240 (“We hold impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . [but this] decision today does not force any state court to allow 
impeachment through the use of prearrest silence . . . [and] [e]ach jurisdiction remains free 
to formulate [its own] rules . . . [to define when] silence is viewed as more probative than 
prejudicial.”). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 240-41. 
84 See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40. 
85 See Brecht, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
86 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
87 Id. at 625-26; see also Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618. 
88 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623-24. 
89 Id. at 624. 
90 Id. at 625. 
91 Id. at 628-29. 
10
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jury‟s verdict” and not whether the error was “harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”92  The Court affirmed the conviction because the 
petitioner‟s post-Miranda silence was mentioned infrequently and the 
weight of the matter was primarily decided on the substantial 
circumstantial evidence.93 
More recently, in Berghuis v. Thompkins,94 the Court held that 
a suspect who makes any uncoerced statement to police waives the 
right to remain silent.95  Thompkins was arrested in Ohio for murder 
and given his Miranda warnings.96  However, he refused to sign a 
document stating he understood the Miranda warnings.97  The police 
then questioned him for about three hours.98  Thompkins remained 
silent almost the entire time.99  Then the police switched their 
questioning to beliefs about God.100  An officer asked if Thompkins 
would pray to God and ask for forgiveness for killing the victim.101  
Thompkins answered in the affirmative.102  This was the key 
evidence submitted for his murder conviction.103 
The Supreme Court held in Thompkins that one can waive the 
right to remain silent by uttering a one-word answer.104  The Court 
granted certiorari to determine: (1) if Thompkins‟ silence invoked his 
                                                          
92 Id. at 622-23; see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 (holding a “harmless-error standard applies in 
determining whether habeas relief must be granted because of a constitutional error of the 
trial type”); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) (stating that the 
“substantial and injurious effect” standard was established in this matter which is a less 
burdensome standard of review where relief for trial error is granted if actual prejudice 
resulted); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding “before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
93 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638-39. 
94 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
95 Id. at 2264. 
96 Id. at 2256. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2258 (“[E]vidence demonstrates that Thompkins was silent for 
two hours and forty-five minutes.”). 
100 Id. at 2257 (stating police asked Thompkins about his belief in God about two hours 
and forty-five minutes into the interrogation and that Thompkins eyes swelled up in tears). 
101 Id. (“Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?”). 
102 Id. (“Thompkins answered „Yes‟ and looked away.”). 
103 Id. (describing denial at suppression hearing concerning inadmissibility of one-word 
answers made during interrogation with police). 
104 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
11
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right to remain silent, and (2) if Thompkins had adequately waived 
that right.105  The Court ruled in favor of the government on both 
issues.106  The Court held that simply being silent was not enough to 
invoke the right to remain silent, but that a suspect needed to 
expressly invoke the right to remain silent.107  This holding is similar 
to the earlier reasoning in Davis v. United States,108 where the Court 
held an express request for an attorney is necessary to invoke the 
right to counsel.109  Secondly, the Court held Thompkins waived his 
right to remain silent as soon as he uttered a word.110  Thompkins 
could have simply remained silent because he understood anything 
he said would be held against him.111 
 
B. New York Approach 
In Conyers, the New York Court of Appeals stated that the 
rules of evidence in New York prevent the use of a defendant‟s post-
arrest silence for impeachment purposes at trial.
112
  The court did not 
address either the due process clause of the New York Constitution 
or the Jenkins v. Anderson decision reached a year earlier by the 
                                                          
105 Id. at 2259. 
106 Id. at 2664 (“Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent . . . he waived his 
right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the police.”). 
107 Id. at 2260 (“Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not 
want to talk with the police . . . . [H]e did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain 
silent.”). 
108 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
109 Id. at 459 (“[T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel . . . he [or she] must 
articulate his [or her] desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable 
police officer in the circumstance would understand the statement to be a request for an 
attorney.”).  
110 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (holding Thompkins waived his right to remain silent 
because his conduct indicated waiver based on the fact he was fully aware of his rights and 
voluntarily responded to the question “about praying to God for forgiveness for shooting the 
victim”). 
111 Id. (“If Thompkins wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing to [the police 
officer‟s] questions, or he could have unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights and ended 
the interrogation.”); id. at 2263-64 (stating an accused‟s statement is admissible at trial if 
Miranda warnings were given and a subsequent implied or express waiver of Miranda rights 
has been determined);  see also id. at 2264.  The Court held a one-word answer was a waiver 
of the right to remain silent. 
112 Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 934 (“[O]ur State rules of evidence preclude the use of a 
defendant‟s [post-arrest] silence to impeach his trial testimony.”). 
12
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United States Supreme Court.113  Thomas Conyers‟ armed robbery 
conviction was overturned by the Appellate Division because the 
prosecutor used his post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes.114  
The New York Court of Appeals stated a defendant‟s post-arrest 
silence is of low probative value because of the awareness of no 
obligation to speak.115  However, the use of post-arrest silence for 
impeachment purposes in front of a jury presents a “grave danger of 
prejudice.”116  The Appellate Division‟s decision was affirmed 
because the New York “judicially created rule of exclusion was 
premised upon the familiar standard [of] whether the prejudicial 
effect outweighs the probative worth of the evidence.”117 
In New York, one can be faced with various nuances 
regarding impeachment issues.  Cross-examination of the defendant 
is only permitted for impeachment purposes if the “door is opened” 
by the defendant‟s direct testimony.118  This examination is permitted 
to impeach the defendant, but not to establish fact.119  Similar to 
federal law, New York law holds that as soon as the defendant‟s 
testimony is discovered to be only suitable for purposes of 
impeachment “any Miranda infirmity becomes irrelevant.”120  
However, voluntary statements obtained by law enforcement in 
violation of a defendant‟s Miranda rights are only permitted to be 
used for impeachment purposes and not for use in the case-in-
                                                          
113 Id. (“[W]e do not find it necessary to consider whether the use of a defendant‟s 
postarrest silence for impeachment purposes is permissible under the constitutional 
principles articulated in Jenkins or whether the due process clause of our State Constitution  
[  ] precludes the use of such evidence to impeach a defendant‟s trial testimony.”); see also 
Jenkins, 447 U.S. 231; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
114 Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 934 (affirming the finding of a due process violation in using 
post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes).  The People requested certiorari and the 
Supreme Court remanded the case due to the Jenkins holding on pre-arrest silence having 
similar constitutional issues.  Id. 
115 Id. at 935. 
116 Id. at 936 n.2. 
117 Id. at 936 (“[O]ur decision today represents a simple recognition of our judicial 
responsibility to formulate rules of evidence to protect the integrity of the truth-finding 
process.”). 
118 People v. Wise, 385 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (N.Y. 1978). 
119 Id. at 1267. 
120 Id.; see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975) (“[I]t does not follow from 
Miranda that evidence inadmissible against [the defendant] in the prosecution‟s case-in-
chief is barred for all purposes . . . . [T]he impeaching material would provide valuable aid 
to the jury in assessing the defendant‟s credibility.”). 
13
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chief.121  In People v. Maerling,122 the defendant invoked his right to 
counsel yet made voluntary statements pertaining to a murder, which 
were improperly obtained, and these statements were allowed to be 
used for impeachment purposes.123  In People v. Savage,124 the 
defendant was read his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived his 
right to remain silent to inform the police about a shooting.125  While 
giving testimony at trial, the defendant mentioned for the first time 
the gun “inadvertently” went off while the victim attempted to rob 
him.126  The Court of Appeals held this flagrant omission was 
properly used for impeachment purposes by the prosecutor.127  
However, as a balancing precaution, “the State is denied the right to 
draw adverse inferences from the fact that a defendant has 
maintained an effective silence, even if something less than total.”128
     The New York harmless error rule pertaining to non-
constitutional trial errors is different than the federal rule for 
constitutional trial errors.129  In New York, all errors of law are 
                                                          
121 People v. Maerling, 474 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. 1984). 
We have permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence for 
[impeachment] purpose[s] . . . . Our rule permits the use for 
impeachment not only statements obtained in violation of a defendant‟s 
Miranda rights, but also of those obtained in violation of his right to 
counsel under the State Constitution.   [However], a statement obtained 
in violation of the defendant‟s Federal constitutional right to counsel is 
not admissible for impeachment purposes . . . . [A]dmissibility rests . . . 
on a determination of voluntariness.  If a statement was voluntary it may 
be used to impeach; if it was not, it may not be admitted. 
Id. 
122 474 N.E.2d 231 (N.Y. 1984). 
123 Id. at 232. 
124 409 N.E.2d 858 (N.Y. 1980). 
125 Id. at 859 (stating the defendant said “I‟m glad I‟m caught - I‟m tired” and 
subsequently told the police about him shooting a man outside a bar). 
126 Id. at 859-60. 
127 Id. at 860-61.  The defendant never mentioned anything about a robbery or the 
accidental firearm discharge prior to trial.  Id. at 861 (holding when someone is a victim of a 
robbery or a gun accidently discharges and such major items are not mentioned the 
“omission speaks more eloquently than words.  It is an elementary rule of evidence, and of 
common sense, in our State . . . that, when given circumstances make it most unnatural to 
omit certain information from a statement, the fact of the omission is itself admissible for 
purposes of impeachment”). 
128 Savage, 409 N.E.2d at 862. 
129 People v. Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d 787, 793 (N.Y. 1975); id. at 791 (stating the test for 
harmless constitutional trial error is “that there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
might have contributed to the defendant‟s conviction and that it was harmless beyond a 
14
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prejudicial and require a reversal “unless that error can be found to 
have been rendered harmless by the weight and the nature of the 
other proof.”130  In one New York Appellate Division case, the 
defendant took the stand during his trial for manslaughter.131  He was 
improperly asked why he did not make a statement regarding his 
version of events prior to the trial.132  On appeal, the prosecutor‟s acts 
were declared improper.133  The conviction was overturned as the acts 
were not harmless and the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.134  
However, in another Appellate Division case, the prosecutor 
impeached the defendant by asking why he did not ask his friends to 
exonerate him at the police station after his arrest for allegedly 
stealing property.135  During summation, the prosecutor informed the 
jury of the defendant‟s post-arrest silence.136  The court did not 
overturn the conviction because the overwhelming evidence rendered 
the prosecutor‟s trial errors harmless.137   
 In New York, it would seem a prosecutor with a strong case 
can take improper steps for impeachment purposes and use the 
prejudicial silence card to cement and maintain high conviction rates.  
This would plausibly coincide with the United States Supreme 
Court‟s holding regarding the standard used to determine whether the 
impact of the prosecution‟s „error‟ had a “substantial and injurious 
effect or influence” on a jury‟s verdict.138  Therefore, it appears the 
possibility of a strong case getting overturned for impeachment errors 
is highly unlikely where guilt was overwhelmingly established 




Tucker‟s conviction was overturned and a new trial was 
                                                                                                                                      
reasonable doubt”). 
130 Id. at 794. 




135 People v. Materon, 716 N.Y.S.2d 313, 313 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2000). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38. 
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granted.139  In light of the Supreme Court‟s holding in Thompkins, it 
strongly appears Tucker waived his right to remain silent.140  He 
expressly invoked his right to remain silent, but shortly afterwards 
said, “I was there, but I did not shoot anybody.”141  Thompkins held 
that a suspect who makes an uncoerced statement to police waives 
the right to remain silent.142  Tucker was not coerced.143  He spoke 
after he was told he was going to be charged with attempted 
murder.144  Tucker appeared to understand his rights because he 
initially told the police he had nothing to say.145  If he wanted to 
remain silent, then he simply could have done so.  The right to 
remain silent can be waived by communicating a single word 
answer.146  Thereafter, what was said can be used in court to impeach 
the defendant.147  However, the New York Court of Appeals 
maintains there is such a thing as “effective silence.”148  The United 
States Supreme Court simply does not—there is either complete 
silence or there is waiver.149  Therefore, anything Tucker said should 
have been allowed to be used against him for impeachment 
purpose.150 
As the dissent indicated, the shooter‟s name was the ultimate 
issue in the case and this blatant name omission left Tucker‟s 
testimony open for impeachment purposes.151  The appellate court 
could have addressed the omission issue differently by not 
downplaying the shooter‟s name in the analysis.152  In custody, 
Tucker waived his right to remain silent as per Thompkins,153 but the 
                                                          
139 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635. 
140 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262-63. 
141 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
142 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263. 
143 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33 (majority opinion). 
144 Id. at 633. 
145 Id. at 632-33. 
146 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
147 Harris, 401 U.S. at 226. 
148 Savage, 409 N.E.2d at 861-62 (“[T]he intent behind the privilege against self 
incrimination, exemplified by the supportive Miranda procedures it has spawned, is not to 
induce silence but only to insure that the choice to speak is free and uncompelled.”). 
149 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
150 Maerling, 474 N.E.2d at 233. 
151 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 638 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 635 (majority opinion). 
153 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
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omitted exculpatory information was only first presented at trial.154  It 
appears his credibility could have been properly impeached.155  
However, the decision determining the unfairness of the defendant‟s 
impeachment during cross-examination ignored the recent Thompkins 
holding and instead allowed New York‟s concept of “effective 
silence” to prevail.156 
The prosecutor made a trial error by ignoring the suppression 
hearing decision.157  The mentioning of Tucker‟s post-arrest “silence” 
during summation was improper.158  However, the defendant 
admitted to being at the crime scene during the time of the 
shooting.159  After three other witnesses testified that he was the 
shooter, Tucker testified he was in the grainy video that captured the 
occurrence of the crime.160  Tucker further claimed that the shooter 
was an individual named “Mustafa” and this statement may have 
divested him of the protections granted from the suppression 
hearing.161  It is plausible Tucker attempted to incorrectly use his 
Miranda rights as a sword, rather than the shield such rights were 
designed to be, in protecting a suspect against self-incrimination.162  
The weight of circumstantial evidence in this matter could have been 
seen as substantial enough to render harmless the prosecutorial error 
made during summation.163  In other words, the summation error 
could appear harmless against “the weight and the nature of the other 
proof.”164  However, despite these conceivable arguments, a new trial 
                                                          
154 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 633. 
155 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264; see also Savage, 409 N.E.2d at 861. 
156 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35; see also Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264; Savage, 409 
N.E.2d at 861. 
157 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
158 Id. at 635 (majority opinion). 
159 Id. at 633. 
160 Id. at 635. 
161 Id. at 637 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
162 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 637. 
163 Id. at 638; see also Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d at 794. 
164 See Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d at 794. 
What is meant here, of course, is that the quantum and nature of proof, 
excising the error, are so logically compelling and therefore forceful in 
the particular case as to lead the appellate court to the conclusion that „a 
jury composed of honest, well-intentioned, and reasonable men and 
women‟ on consideration of such evidence would almost certainly have 
convicted the defendant. 
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was warranted due to a “lack of overwhelming evidence of the 
defendant‟s guilt” and the highly prejudicial effect of referencing the 
defendant‟s post-arrest silence during the government‟s cross-
examination and summation.165 
The true point of contention is that the prosecution‟s multiple 
summation errors did much more than simply compound the 
government‟s cross-examination error.166  Tucker‟s post-arrest 
statements were held not be used during the government‟s case-in-
chief.167  A prosecutor who repeatedly makes blatant comments 
referencing suppressed evidence during summation should simply 
suffer the consequences of a mistrial.  Such an audacious disregard of 
Fifth Amendment rights should not be tolerated or held to be 
“harmless.”  When the law demands you are not to be given an inch, 
justice mandates severity when a yard is deliberately taken.  We need 
to seriously consider the aggregate effect of such flagrant 
prosecutorial misconduct regarding one of our fundamental 
constitutional rights.  After all, “[o]ur government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher . . . liberty demand[s] that government officials 
shall be subject[ ] to  . . . rules of conduct . . . [and if those rules are 
disregarded] it [would] breed[ ] contempt for [the] law [and] invite[ ] 
every man to become a law unto himself; it [would] invite[ ] 
anarchy.”168 





                                                                                                                                      
Id. 
165 Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635 (majority opinion). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 637 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
168 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-80. 
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